To Draft or Not to Draft? by Poutvaara, Panu & Wagener, Andreas
This document is downloaded from
HELDA - The Digital Repository of
University of Helsinki.
Title To Draft or Not to Draft?
Author(s) Poutvaara, Panu; Wagener, Andreas
Date 2006
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10138/16801
HELDA - The Digital Repository of University of Helsinki - Terms and User Rights
By using HELDA - The Digital Repository of University of Helsinki you are bound by the following Terms & Conditions.
Please read them carefully.
I have read and I understand the following statement:
All material supplied via HELDA is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, and duplication or sale of all
or part of any of the repository collections is not permitted, except that material may be duplicated by you for your research
use or educational purposes in electronic or print form. You must obtain permission for any other use. Electronic or print
copies may not be offered, whether for sale or otherwise to anyone who is not an authorised user.
öMmföäflsäafaäsflassflassflas
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
Discussion Papers
To Draft or Not to Draft?
Efficiency, Generational Incidence, and
Political Economy of Military Conscription
Panu Poutvaara
University of Helsinki and HECER
and
Andreas Wagener
University of Vienna
Discussion Paper No. 99
March 2006
ISSN 1795-0562
HECER – Helsinki Center of Economic Research, P.O. Box 17 (Arkadiankatu 7), FI-00014
University of Helsinki, FINLAND, Tel +358-9-191-28780, Fax +358-9-191-28781,
E-mail info-hecer@helsinki.fi, Internet www.hecer.fi
HECER
Discussion Paper No.99
To Draft or Not to Draft? Efficiency, Generational
Incidence, and Political Economy of Military
Conscription *
Abstract
We study the efficiency and distributional consequences of establishing and abolishing the
draft in a dynamic model with overlapping generations, taking into account endogenous
human capital formation as well as government budget constraints. The introduction of the
draft initially benefits the older generation while harming the young and all future
generations. Its Pareto-improving abolition requires levying age-dependent taxes on the
young. These being infeasible, abolition of the draft would harm the old. The
intergenerational incidence of the gains and losses from its introduction and abolition helps
to explain the political allure of the draft.
JEL Classification: H20, H57, I21, D63.
Keywords: Draft, Conscription, Education, Intergenerational fairness.
Panu Poutvaara Andreas Wagener
Department of Economics Department of Economics
University of Helsinki University of Vienna
P.O. Box 17 (Arkadiankatu 7) Hohenstaufengasse 9
FI-00014 University of Helsinki 1010 Vienna
FINLAND AUSTRIA
e-mail: panu.poutvaara@helsinki.fi e-mail: andreas.wagener@univie.ac.at
* We are grateful for useful comments by two anonymous referees and by seminar
participants in Cologne, Linz, and at WZB Berlin.
1 Introduction
Governments can recruit their manpower either by hiring workers at market
wages or by compulsory labor service. Both methods rely on the government’s
power to tax: either as an in-kind tax levied on drafted people in form of
forced labor or as pecuniary taxes, raised to be spent on remunerating hired
workers. Today’s democracies no longer rely on forced labor – with the
notable exception of the military draft and its corollary, civil service.1 Ten
out of the 26 NATO members are still utilizing conscription, among them
Germany, Turkey, Greece and the Baltic States.
The draft still heavily intrudes into the lives of young men in several Asian
countries with spells of at least two years, in Russia and most other successor
states of the defunct Soviet Union as well as throughout Latin America, the
Arab World and the Middle East (where draft duration is generally between
24 and 36 months).2 Israel, Eritrea and Tunisia deserve mention as, unlike
the rest of the world, they also draw women into compulsory military service.
Even though most OECD countries have either abolished the military
draft or are debating this, the possibility of re-introducing or maintaining
the draft or more general compulsory labor service resurfaces, from time to
time. In 2004, the United States issued stop-loss orders that kept thousands
of reservists and National Guard members past their agreed terms in Iraq;
several critics of President Bush argue that this amounts to a back-door draft.
In France, where military conscription has been abolished since 1997, both
the Socialist Party and the centre-right UDF advocate a compulsory civil
service – an idea that gathered momentum as “un investissement républicain”
in the wake of the street riots in fall 2005 (Libération, 2005).
At least since Adam Smith, economists have raised strong reservations
about the draft and other forms of involuntary service (for recent surveys,
see Sandler and Hartley, 1995, Chapter 6; Warner and Asch, 2001). Most ob-
1According to ILO (2001), there are three types of forced labor which involve govern-
ment coercion (as contrasted to slavery, bonded labor or people tra¢cking which rely on
private coercion): (i) compulsory labor, when people are required by law to work on public
construction projects; as is practiced in Cambodia, the Central African Republic, Kenya,
Burma (Myanmar), Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Vietnam; (ii) military work,
when civilians are forced by the government authorities to work for military purposes; as
is widespread in Burma (Myanmar); (iii) prison labor, i.e., the contracting out of prison
labor or the forcing of prisoners to work for pro…t-making enterprises; as is practised in
China, Cote d’Ivoire, Madagascar, and Malaysia, but also in democratic countries such as
Australia, Austria, France, Germany, New Zealand, and the United States.
2In North Korea, compulsory military service takes three to ten years, in South Korea
26-30 months, and in China and Taiwan 24 months. For a comprehensive listing of military
systems throughout the world, see CIA (2006).
viously, relying on forced labor foregoes the bene…ts of specialization, as well
as it fails to take into account di¤erences in opportunity costs and compar-
ative advantage. Sta¢ng military or hospitals by unmotivated or underpaid
draftees easily results in shirking and considerable loss of potential output.
In countries like Russia, the army is plagued by a culture of violence against
draftees, resulting even according to o¢cial reports in hundreds of deaths
annually (The Economist, 2005). Less drastically, but still testifying of the
signi…cant costs of military draft, former conscripts usually su¤er from lower
earnings than those exempted from the draft (see Angrist, 1990, and Imbens
and van der Klaauw, 1995). To the extent that these earnings reductions
are due to a lower stock of human capital of ex-draftees, they constitute a
sizable dynamic cost of the draft that will hit society as a whole – not just
draftees (Lau et al., 2004).
Even if there were a consensus that the draft is an ine¢cient system, still
a considerable opposition might resist its abolition. Older cohorts who have
already delivered their military service, understandably, raise an objection
that they would su¤er a double burden in case of moving to voluntary forces:
…rst as young draftees and then later in form of higher taxes to …nance a
professional army. In a democracy in which the majority of citizens has
already passed the age of a draft (which typically is in the late teens and
early twenties) and where future generations are not represented politically,
a majority of voters might well support a draft even if it is ine¢cient from
the perspective of steady-state generations. Correspondingly, middle-aged
taxpayers might be tempted to introduce a draft system in order to escape
the monetary tax burden of paying for a professional army, thereby neglecting
dynamic costs that a draft imposes on future generations.
In this paper, we consider the economic and political dynamics of estab-
lishing and abolishing compulsory labor services. These compulsory labor
services may consist not only of military draft, but also on work in the social
sector or other activities deemed socially valuable. For the sake of simplicity
we stick to the military terminology though. In short, we show that setting
up a draft system (rather than running an all-volunteer army) distorts the
accumulation of human capital, and forces young people to work when they
should still be studying. Due to this ine¢cient timing of work and studies,
the draft imposes a larger tax burden than collecting the same resources
with distorting wage taxes. Therefore, the draft comes at the cost of a lower
steady-state stock of human capital. We derive this result in a one-sector
economy where the output can be used for civilian consumption as well as
for military purposes. This simpli…cation also implies that a distinction of
various types of human capital (say, human capital acquired by military
training and human capital accumulated in civilian education) is not needed.
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The homogeneity assumption on both goods and human capital delib-
erately rules out all bene…ts from specialization but is clearly not realistic.
Furthermore, our assumption that draft takes place before investment in ed-
ucation may be viewed as biased against the draft. We therefore extend the
model to a two-sector economy with military and civilian production where
individuals can acquire sector-speci…c productivity advantages by choosing
their type of education, assuming that education takes place before an even-
tual draft. Our result that a draft system leads to a lower stock of human
capital than a professional army holds also for the more complex economy.
If military draft has been established, it can always be abolished in a
Pareto-improving manner by replacing it with age-dependent taxes, collected
only from the young. With a positive interest rate, such frontloading of the
tax burden results in a lower utility for steady-state generations than if taxes
to …nance a professional army would be collected from all age cohorts. Thus,
it is impossible to fully undo the dynamic costs of once established draft
systems again, without additionally hurting at least one generation.
Previous literature on the economic e¤ects of the draft has largely used
static and partial equilibrium models. In pioneering studies, Hansen and
Weisbrod (1967) and Oi (1967) evaluate the distributive and allocative e¤ects
of the draft. They particularly highlight that the draft imposes special in-
kind taxes and, due to low payment, implicit income taxes exclusively on the
young adult part of the population. Unlike the present paper, these papers do
not analyze the generational incidence of starting or ending a draft scheme.
Taking as their starting point the U.S. draft scheme during the Vietnam
War period, Hansen and Weisbrod (1967) as well as Fisher (1969) assess the
cost of replacing compulsory conscription by an all-volunteer force. Both
studies estimate substantial increases in budgetary needs in order to …nance
such a transition, but they do not embed this observation into a general
equilibrium model with a government budget constraint, alternative ways
of tax …nance, and the repercussions of this on the rest of the economy.
Our paper analyzes the e¤ects of starting and ending the draft when the
wage tax rate is determined endogenously to balance the government budget
constraint.
Harford and Marcus (1988) and Lee and McKenzie (1992) study the ef-
fects of the draft in a static general equilibrium framework with exogenous
productivities. In a dynamic general equilibrium model with human capital
accumulation, Lau et al. (2004) derive estimates for the excess burden of the
draft that results from its distorting e¤ect on human capital decisions. The
analysis is con…ned to comparing the steady states of economies with and
without the draft. Unlike our paper, none of the studies so far has explic-
itly taken into account the e¤ects of introducing or abolishing the draft on
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transition generations.
Modes of recruiting military manpower not only di¤er in their opportunity
costs but also in the direct costs of their administration and implementation.
These costs are lower in countries with a well-developed and sophisticated
administrative system. Mulligan and Shleifer (2005) o¤er this as an alter-
native explanation why some countries adopt a draft system while others
do not; they …nd that countries with an administrative and legal system of
French origin are more likely to draft than common law countries. Mulligan
and Shleifer (2005) assume that each di¤erent conscription system (including
the all-volunteer army) is the most e¢cient solution with some combination
of the size of the military force and population. By contrast, we suggest
that even if a draft system would be universally less e¢cient than a volun-
tary army, it might still be maintained as a political equilibrium due to the
intergenerational incidence of tax burden.
Our paper is organized as follows. We introduce an overlapping gener-
ations model with a given public sector resource requirement and private
investment in education in section 2. We derive steady states with and with-
out a draft in section 3, and study transition in section 4. Section 5 extends
the model to a two-sector economy with sector-speci…c types of education
and an eventual draft taking place after private investment in education. It
shows that our results also carry over to more complex economies. Section 6
concludes. All proofs are collected in an appendix.
2 Model
Consider an economy with two active overlapping generations. Every gen-
eration consists of the same number of ex-ante identical individuals; this
number is normalized to one. If necessary, we index time by t. We refer to
the generation that is in their youth in period t as “generation t”.
The economy is a small and open one and there are perfect capital markets
where consumption can be shifted over time at an exogenous interest rate of
r ¸ 0 per period.
In each of the two periods of his life, every individual has available a
certain time endowment, again normalized to one. During youth a fraction
® of the time endowment has to be spent for education. Moreover, the young
may be called for service, lasting a fraction d of their time endowment. The
rest of the time is used for working and denoted by `. During working age,
individuals work full-time.
Individuals are born with some innate human capital, the stock of which
is normalized to unity. During their education period, individuals decide on
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how much e¤ort to spend on studying or training. E¤ort in studying increases
the productivity of human capital according to a function w = w(e). This
function is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and satis…es w(0) = 1. Once
acquired, the quality of human capital does not change over the life-cycle.
Individual’s preferences are separable in consumption over the two periods
of life and e¤ort for studying. With perfect capital markets, individuals are,
as far as consumption is concerned, only interested in the net present value of
income over their life-cycle. E¤ort in education generates a utility cost which
in terms of consumption equals c(e); the function c is strictly increasing and
convex.
There are two sectors in the economy: a private one and the military.
Output y in the private sector is produced by employing labor (measured
in e¢ciency units) in a linear production technology. Thus, for output in
period t we obtain:
yt = `t ¢ w(et) + 1 ¢ w(et¡1)
where `t and 1 are the working hours of generation t and t ¡ 1 in period t.
The military is run by the government, and doing this is the only task
of the government. We measure output of the military in terms of private
consumption and assume that its level is exogenously …xed at ¹m > 0. We,
thus, do not analyze the politically or economically optimal size of military
expenditure but rather suppose that society considers ¹m as a suitable level
of national defence and security.
To produce ¹m, the government can choose between a professional army
(all-volunteer force) and a draft system.3 In a professional army, the govern-
ment buys from the labor market the number of labor units that is necessary
to produce ¹m. It …nances military expenditure with a tax on income (private-
sector output). Denoting the tax rate in period t by ¿ t, government budget
balance requires
¿ tyt = ¹m: (1)
With a professional army, the net-present value of an individual’s income is
w(et) ¢
·
(1¡ ¿ t)(1¡ ®) + (1¡ ¿ t+1)
1 + r
¸
where w(et) is the individual’s wage rate and productivity, 1¡ ® is working
time during youth, and 1=(1+ r) is the present value of an additional unit of
3In reality, armies that only rely on draftees do not exist. All countries employ some
professional soldiers to run their armies (and some professional nurses to sta¤ hospitals
and care units). Incorporating this aspect into our model could be done at the cost of
some additional complexity. However, none of our results would be qualitatively a¤ected
by such a modi…cation.
5
income during working age (recall that working time is one then). If the tax
rate does not change over the life-cycle (¿ t+1 = ¿ t), we can write life-time
income as
(1¡ ¿ t) ¢ w(et) ¢ ¡
where
¡ =
2¡ ® ¡ ®r + r
1 + r
· 2¡ ® (2)
for all r ¸ 0 and 0 · ® · 1. Lifetime utility with a professional army then
amounts to
up(et) = ¡c(et) + (1¡ ¿ t) ¢ w(et) ¢ ¡: (3)
In a draft system, the government recruits a certain number of young
individuals before these start their education and employs them in the pro-
duction of military output for a certain amount of time d. Since the pro-
ductivity of uneducated young is normalized to unity, the length of the draft
necessary to produce output ¹m is d = ¹m. As no resources other than labor
are needed to operate the military, there is no need to set up a government
budget constraint under this regime.
With a draft system, individual’s time spent for work during youth is
1¡®¡d. Provided that (the young expect that) the draft will be maintained
also in the next period and, hence, no income taxes are collected, lifetime
income equals
w(et) ¢
·
(1¡ d ¡ ®) + 1
1 + r
¸
= w(et) ¢ (¡¡ d)
and a utility level of
ud(et) = ¡c(et) + w(et) ¢ (¡¡ d) (4)
will be realized.
3 Steady States
We now compare the steady-state equilibria of economies with a professional
army and a draft system. Given that variables are time-invariant, we can
omit time subscripts.
In an economy with a professional army, individuals choose e as to max-
imize (3), thereby taking the tax rate as given. The …rst-order condition
reads as
¡c0(e) + (1¡ ¿ )¡w0(e) = 0 (5)
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and de…nes optimal education e¤ort as a function of the tax rate. Obviously
from (5), the higher taxes the lower educational e¤ort (both ¡c(e) and w(e)
are concave).
Steady-state national income with a professional army is
y(e) = (2¡ ®) ¢ w(e): (6)
In an equilibrium the tax rate ¿ has to be adjusted as to balance government
budget; i.e., from (1) and (6),
¿ =
¹m
(2¡ ®)w(e) : (7)
The amount of educational investment ep in an economy with a profes-
sional army can therefore be determined from plugging (7) into (5); it is
implicitly given by:
¡c0(ep) + w0(ep) ¢ (2¡ ®)w(e
p)¡ ¹m
(2¡ ®)w(ep) ¢ ¡ = 0: (8)
Denote by V p the steady-state utility arising from individual optimization in
an economy with a professional army:
V p = up(ep) = ¡c(ep) + (1¡ ¿ p)w(ep)
where ¿p = ¹m
(2¡®)w(ep) .
With a draft system, the optimal e¤ort invested in human capital ed is
determined from maximizing (4); the …rst-order condition reads as
¡c0(ed) + w0(ed) ¢ (¡¡ ¹m) = 0 (9)
where we already substituted ¹m for d. Denote by V d the maximum utility
obtainable in a draft economy:
V d = ud(ed) = ¡c(ed) + w(ed)(¡¡ ¹m):
A comparison of a drafted and a professional army yields the following
results:
Proposition 1 For all levels of military output ¹m, the e¤ort into human
capital and, therefore, national output and private consumption are lower in
an economy with a draft system than in an economy with a professional army:
ed < ep: (10)
Moreover, the utility level in the steady-state of an economy with a draft
system always falls short of the utility level in the steady-state of an economy
with a professional army:
V d < V p: (11)
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The …rst part of Proposition 1 shows that a draft system distorts the
accumulation of human capital, relative to a professional army. Empirical
evidence for this dynamic cost of the draft has been found by Angrist (1990)
and Imbens and van der Klaauw (1995), and computational estimates for its
considerable impact on national output are provided in Lau et al. (2004).
To see the intuition for this result, consider by how much military output
¹m crowds out marginal incentives for human capital investment under the
two regimes of draft and professional army. In the case of the draft, where
d = ¹m=w(0), we get from (4) that the impact of ¹m on the marginal utility
from education e¤ort amounts to
¡ ¹m ¢ 1
w(0)
¢ w0(e): (12)
The disincentives result from the fact that the returns to human capital
investment do not accrue over the full length of life but only for the remaining
lifetime after draft d. In the case of a professional army, military output
enters utility in (3) via the tax rate. The disincentives on education e¤ort
can be measured by
¡¿ ¢
µ
1¡ ®+ 1
1 + r
¶
¢ w0(e) = ¡ ¹m ¢ 1¡ a+
1
1+r
2¡ a ¢
1
w(e)
¢ w0(e) (13)
where we used the steady-state level of ¿ from (7). Comparing (12) and (13),
disincentive e¤ects on human capital investment are lower with a professional
army than with military conscription for two independent reasons. First,
there is a timing e¤ect : The draft hits individuals in the early period of their
lives while the burden from tax-…nancing a professional army is evenly spread
over the life-cycle. This front-loading of the draft causes an extra burden
which is re‡ected by the interest rate r on the LHS of (13). The presence
of r renders the fraction smaller than one; with r = 0 front-loading would
not matter and the timing e¤ect disappear. Second, there is a level e¤ect :
While in the case of the draft military output is produced using labor of low
productivity w(0), it is e¤ectively provided with (average) post-education
productivity w(e) > w(0) in the case of a professional army. Again, this
leads to higher disincentives for education e¤ort under a draft regime.
The second part of Proposition 1 establishes the superiority of a profes-
sional army over a drafted army in terms of steady-state utilities. It adds
to a collection of results in the literature that the draft is an economically
suboptimal arrangement for recruiting sta¤ to the government sector (for
a survey see, e.g., Sandler and Hartley, 1995, Chapter 6). However, these
…ndings are based on static ine¢ciencies (forgone bene…ts of specialization,
8
ine¢cient job matches etc.). By contrast, Proposition 1 emerges from the
intertemporal distortion of human capital investments.
4 Transition Dynamics
4.1 Introducing the draft
Suppose that prior to some date t the economy was running a professional
army, but that the government announces plans to introduce a draft system
e¤ectively of date t, before generation t will decide on their study e¤ort. We
assume that this policy change could not be anticipated before period t¡1.4
Clearly, all generations t0 with t0 · t ¡ 2 will be una¤ected (they are dead
already at t). From Proposition 1 all generations t0 with t0 ¸ t will su¤er
from the introduction of the draft, relative to the professional-army scenario.
Generation t ¡ 1 will, however, welcome the introduction of the draft since
it will save the taxes it would, with a professional army, have had to pay
during the second period of its working age. Its utility therefore is:
Vt¡1 = ¡c(ep) + (1¡ ¿ p)w(ep)(1¡ ®) + w(ep)=(1 + r) > V p:
Hence, introducing the draft is bene…cial to those who are old in the period
of introduction but harms all future generations.
4.2 Abolishing the draft
Suppose now that prior to some date t the economy was running a con-
scription system but that the government announces plans to switch to a
professional army e¤ectively by date t. Again assume that this policy change
could not be anticipated prior to period t. Can such a move be arranged in
a Pareto-improving way?
Introducing a professional army requires (additional) tax revenues. A
Pareto-improving transition requires that generation t ¡ 1 (who has already
delivered its military service under the draft system) must not be harmed
by the new taxes. Hence, the taxes due in t can only be levied on the then
young generation t.
4If the introduction of military draft were anticipated, then the last generation free
from draft would invest more in education, anticipating that its second-period income
would not be taxed. This would increase the utility gain of the old transition generation,
without a¤ecting the utility loss of the drafted generations.
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The necessary tax rate ¿ at to …nance abolition of the draft in period t
emerges from the budget constraint:
¿ at ¢ (1¡ ®)w(et) = ¹m
where (1¡®) is the working time of generation t in period t. In period t+1,
this generation will not pay any taxes. Hence, generation t’s life-time income
amounts to
w(et) ¢
·
(1¡ ®)(1¡ ¿ at ) +
1
1 + r
¸
:
The same applies to all future generations; we therefore omit time subscripts
henceforth. Utility maximization then implies that educational e¤ort satis-
…es:
¡c0(e) + w0(e) ¢
·
(1¡ ®)(1¡ ¿ a) + 1
1 + r
¸
= 0:
Plugging in the (time-invariant) tax rate ¿a implicitly de…nes the equilibrium
value of educational e¤ort ea:
¡c0(ea) + w0(ea) ¢
·
1¡ ® + 1
1 + r
¡ ¹m
w(ea)
¸
= 0: (14)
Denoting the attending utility level by V a, we obtain
Proposition 2 For all levels of military output ¹m, provided through a vol-
unteer army, the e¤ort into human capital and, consequently, output and
consumption as well as the maximally obtainable utility level for the steady-
state generations are never larger if the taxes needed to …nance the army
are levied exclusively on the young generation rather than spread across all
cohorts:
ea · ep and V a · V p: (15)
Both inequalities are strict whenever r > 0.
The …rst part of Proposition 2 is driven by the same timing e¤ect as
its analogue in Proposition 1. Here, we are comparing two scenarios: one
where taxes are levied at the same rate over the full life-cycle, and one where
taxes are due only in the …rst period of one’s life. With a zero interest rate,
the timing of taxes is irrelevant. With a positive interest rate, front-loading
taxes entails a higher burden, even if the amount of taxes that the government
raises at any point in time is identical. Lower after-tax return to education
reduces private investment in education.5
5Unlike Proposition 1, the comparison of the two types of …nancing a professional
army in Proposition 2 does not entail a level-e¤ect. In both scenarios, military output is
produced using labor of average productivity.
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As could be expected, this also involves a loss in utility. Replacing the
draft by a professional army that is …nanced by taxes only on the young leads
to a situation that is worse for the steady-state generations than if the draft
had never been introduced. Levying the tax on the young is, however, the
only way to prevent the generation that is old when the transition from draft
to professional army takes place from being harmed. Thus, the welfare of
the steady-state generations is lower once the draft is introduced and again
abolished than if it had never been there in the …rst place.
This result does not change if we allow the use of government debt during
a transition. To see this, assume that the government has access to credit
markets, and faces the same interest rate as individuals.6 Suppose further
that it aims to organize transition from the draft to a professional army so
that the young generation at the time of transition would be equally well
o¤ as the young generations in a steady-state without draft. This would,
however, require public debt to reduce the lifetime tax burden of the initial
young generation. As long as the government used public debt to keep the
current young generation at the level of the steady-state generations without
draft, public debt would accumulate. Once the government started to redeem
its debt, the then young generations would be left with a lower utility level
than without public debt.
In essence, the impossibility to completely undo the e¤ects of a once-
introduced draft system is due to the same mechanism as the impossibility
to replace an ine¢cient pay-as-you-go pension scheme by a funded one: Like
the introduction of a pay-as-you-go scheme, introducing a draft amounts to
a “present” to the generation that is old at that moment. Such a gift may
be revolved, but can never be accomplished such as to make everybody in
the future equally well o¤ as without the gift. Military draft di¤ers from
a pay-as-you-go social security scheme that could be viewed as an implicit
government debt in one important aspect. Given that human capital can-
not be transferred between generations and over time, there is no hope for
neutrality in the sense of Ricardian equivalence with a draft system. The
dynamic costs of the draft in the form of lower investment in human capital
will persist even if the government would repay draftees afterwards the value
of resources it has con…scated them. For the same reason, the negative im-
pact that replacing wage taxes by draft has on the young and all subsequent
generations cannot be undone even in a Barrovian dynasty.
Although abolishing the draft never can re-establish the situation with
6If the government could borrow at a lower interest rate, then it would be optimal to
issue debt to subsidize the …rst period wage and …nance this by taxing the second period
wage, independently of whether there is draft or professional army. Assuming that the
government and individuals face the same interest rate excludes such free lunches.
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a professional army, doing so is nevertheless advisable since it improves the
situation relative to a perpetuation of a draft scheme. I.e., relative to a
continuation of a draft system, abolishing conscription and entirely front-
loading the …scal burden of professionalization increases the utility levels
of those who are young at the point of transition and of the steady-state
generations after transition (while leaving those who are old at the time of
transition una¤ected):
Proposition 3 Replacing a draft system with a professional army that is
…nanced by taxes that are exclusively levied on the young leads to a Pareto-
improvement. It also goes along with an increase in the human capital stock
of the economy.
Taking stock of the results, we obtain:
V p ¸ V a > V d;
where the …rst inequality is strict if r > 0. Running a professional army, thus,
is the best option society could choose. The second inequality implies that
a draft is an ine¢cient way of transferring resources to the initially elderly
generation. Should society choose to give the initially elderly a windfall
gain at the expense of all future generations, it is less costly to do this by
starting to levy age-dependent taxes. Should the mistake of introducing a
draft system be committed, society will have to pay a price for that, at least
if age-dependent taxes are not feasible: either it continues with the draft
system, lowering utility levels to V d, or one generation has to face a double
burden, …rst being subject to the draft and then be additionally taxed when
the draft is abolished. Taxing the older generation in the transition period
for a second time (the …rst burden imposed on them was their conscription
while young) would set the economy on the non-draft time path and would
deliver the corresponding high utility for all future generations, in exchange
for lower utility for the transition generation. If the transition from the draft
system to a volunteer army is organized such as not to impose additional
harm on those who have already been hurt by the draft, the tax costs of
abolishing the draft are fully loaded on young generations by imposing age-
dependent taxes. This would involve steady-state utility that falls in between
the levels of perpetual volunteer and conscription systems.
We assumed that the abolition of military draft was not anticipated. If
it were, then the last drafted generation would further reduce its investment
in education, anticipating the double burden. With age-dependent taxes
collected only from the young, anticipating the abolition of draft would not
a¤ect older generations drafted themselves.
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We analyzed the transition from an all-volunteer force to an army of
conscripts or vice versa in a model with only two overlapping generations.
Correspondingly, the economy switches from one steady state to the other
within just one period. However, this should not be seen as a limitation
for the validity of our …ndings: In a stable n-OLG model (where n > 2),
the transition would take at most n ¡ 1 periods – until the …rst generation
a¤ected by the policy change has perished. Transitional dynamics might
be more complex then, but the e¤ects and the generational incidence of
switching in the recruiting regime would be qualitatively identical.
5 Extension: Military and Civilian Careers
5.1 Modi…cation of the Model
The set-up so far has been based on two simplifying assumptions:
² Although the economy comprises a private and a military sector, ed-
ucation has so far not been sector-speci…c. This rules out all bene…ts
from specialization and, thus, eliminates one of the classical arguments
for running a professional army. However, the assumption also ignores
the potential costs arising when individuals switch from one sector to
another without having acquired an education that is suited best for
the sector into which they enter. This is particularly relevant for pro-
fessional soldiers most of whom move to jobs in the civilian sector after
…nishing their military contract.
² We assumed that draftees enter into military service as uneducated in-
dividuals with low productivities while a professional army produces
its output with educated individuals of average productivity. This as-
sumption (which is responsible for the level e¤ect identi…ed in Sec-
tion 3) might be regarded as unfairly biased against military conscrip-
tion. Moreover, it is questionable in so far as in reality (i) draftees are
called to service after having …nished at least parts of their education
and (ii) professional soldiers and draftees do, at least upon entrance
into the army, not di¤er in age and, thus, their human capital.
In this section we dispense with these assumptions. Corresponding with
the two-sector economy, individuals can now choose between two types of
education: “military” and “civilian”. Choosing an educational type means
acquiring a comparative advantage for the respective sector.
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In the case of a draft system, people invest in their civilian education7
before being drafted to the army for a time d (the rest of the …rst period is
spent with work in the civilian sector). In case of professional army, people
invest either in civilian or military education and then decide on the sector
to which they want to become employed.
Independently of its type, education is equally costly in terms of e¤ort.
Each type of education is applicable in either sector, but possibly with re-
duced productivity if the types of sector and education do not match. Wages
in the civilian sector equal marginal productivities in the civilian sector.
However, the market values of military and civilian human capital may dif-
fer, and the government may decide to deviate from productivity wages if it
recruits soldiers to the army.
With a professional army, people can choose two careers: “military” and
“civilian”. “Military career” means to work as a professional soldier in the
…rst period of life and then switch to the civilian sector in the second; “civilian
career” means to work in the civilian sector for both periods of life.
As before, individuals decide on the education e¤ort e. Incomes over the
life-cycle depend on the choices of career and of education type:
² If education type is “civilian” and career is “civilian”, wage rates in the
…rst and second period are given by (w(e); w(e)).
² If education type is “military” and career is “military”, wage rates in
the …rst and second period are given by (°w(e); (1 ¡ ¯)w(e)) where
¯; ° > 0 and ° is the wage rate that the army pays per unit of e¤ective
labor.
² If education type is “civilian” and career is “military”, wage rates in the
…rst and second period are given by ((1¡ ¯)°w(e); w(e)). We assume
that the relative productivity loss ¯ resulting from a mismatch between
education and employment is the same here as in the previous item.
Output in the military sector for those with military education is w(e)
and (1¡ ¯)w(e) for those with civilian education.
Abusing terminology, we can thus call it a “military [civilian] career” if
the individual chooses the military [civilian] option for both education and
career, and “mixed career” if someone …rst acquires civilian education but
then enters the military career.
7Our assumptions below ensure that, with a draft system, investing in military educa-
tion is always dominated in terms of private returns by investing in civilian education.
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The lifetime utilities in, respectively, a civilian, military, or mixed career
are given by
U c(e) = ¡c(e) + (1¡ ¿ )
·
1¡ ®+ 1
1 + r
¸
w(e) (16)
Um(e) = ¡c(e) + (1¡ ¿ )
·
°(1¡ ®) + 1¡ ¯
1 + r
¸
w(e) (17)
U cm(e) = ¡c(e) + (1¡ ¿ )
·
(1¡ ®)(1¡ ¯)° + 1
1 + r
¸
w(e): (18)
In case of a professional army, we assume that the government can decide
whether to hire those with military or those with civilian education in the
military. We will discuss both options in turn.
5.2 Hiring Civilians to the Military
In this section, we assume that the government chooses to hire only those in
the military who have completed a civilian education. Clearly, this means
that potential gains from utilizing specialized human capital in the army
are forgone. Yet, comparing such a scenario with a draft regime (which also
employs individuals with civilian education) enables us to show the inferiority
of the latter.
In order to compensate soldiers with civilian education for the fact that
only the fraction 1¡¯ of their civilian human capital is applicable as military
human capital, the government has to set
° =
1
1¡ ¯ : (19)
With this choice, the lifetime utilities of those in civilian and in mixed careers
coincide. Civilians and soldiers who acquire civilian education choose the
same optimal education e¤ort, ec = ecm, and an occupational equilibrium
with U c(ec) = U cm(ecm) is reached. We obtain8
Proposition 4 At all levels of military output ¹m and positive interest rates
r > 0, the government can choose a recruiting strategy for a professional
army so that the e¤ort into human capital and, therefore, national output
and private consumption are higher in this economy than with a draft system.
Hence, a professional army that employs soldiers with civilian education
always dominates a draftee army. The reason is the timing e¤ect, i.e., the
8We are grateful to an anonymous referee for indicating this result to us.
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speci…c incidence of the draft tax in the …rst period of the life-cycle. For
r = 0, a professional army sta¤ed with civilians and a draft system are
equivalent; the “level e¤ects” of Section 3 are absent due to the fact that
professional soldiers and draftees are equally well educated. Proposition 4
can be regarded as an analogue to the second part of Proposition 2 as military
draft in the current scenario can essentially be viewed as an age-speci…c tax
imposed on younger cohorts.
5.3 Hiring Soldiers to the Military
To realize bene…ts from specialization, individuals with military (rather than
with civilian) education should be recruited to a professional army. However,
this comes at the drawback that, after …nishing their military contract, these
individuals will work in the civilian sector for which their human capital is
less than ideally suited. In this section, we establish su¢cient conditions
such that a professional army nevertheless dominates a conscripted army.
Again, an occupational equilibrium requires that all combinations of ed-
ucation and career path that are actually chosen by some individual yield
the same life-time utility. If the government pays a wage rate of
° = 1 +
¯
(1¡ ®)(1 + r) (20)
in the military sector, then the bracketed terms in utility functions (16) and
(17) coincide. Hence, civilians and soldiers choose the same optimal amount
of education e¤ort, ec = em, and an occupational equilibrium is reached,
U c(ec) = Um(em).9
Proposition 5 An economy that applies compensation strategy (20) to at-
tract individuals with military training to its professional army will induce
a higher e¤ort into human capital than an otherwise identical economy that
uses a draft system (i.e., ec ¸ ed) if and only if
(1¡ ¯)
·
1 +
¯
(1¡ ®)(1 + r)
¸
·
2¡ ® ¡ ¹mr¯
w(ec)(1¡®)(1+r)
1¡ ®+ 1
1+r
: (21)
As it generally includes w(ec), one cannot properly analyze condition
(21) without knowing the comparative statics of ec in the model parameters.
9Note that choosing to pay wage ° in the military is only one option for the government
when running a professional army. In principle, it could choose also a di¤erent ° in which
case those choosing a military career would choose a di¤erent investment in military human
capital.
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Holding ec parametrically …xed, however, condition (21) is more likely to
hold (and, thus, a professional army will more likely induce higher e¤ort in
human capital investment than a draft system) if the military budget ¹m is
small. The impact of the other parameters ®, ¯, r is unclear in general.
There are, however, three interesting cases which can be analyzed safely:
No productivity di¤erences (¯ = 0): It is easy to verify that, for r = 0,
we obtain ec = ed (no di¤erence between professional army and draft system)
while for r > 0 we have ec > ed. The negative impact of the draft system
here results from the timing e¤ect identi…ed in Section 3.
No time cost from studying (® = 0): In the Appendix we show that
inequality (21) strictly holds for all r; ¯ ¸ 0. By a continuity argument, a
professional army will thus imply higher levels of human capital than military
conscription as long as time costs of studying are small, relative to the length
of …rst working period in the life cycle.
Zero interest rate (r = 0): Here, (21) simpli…es to
ec ¸ ed () ® · ¯:
Hence, a draft system will lead to higher investments in human capital than
a professional army hiring soldiers with military education only if produc-
tivity di¤erences between military and civilian employment are small or if
professional life (relative to education time ®) is short in the …rst period.
Recall, however, that a professional army hiring soldiers with civilian educa-
tion would dominate also in these cases. Also, recall that we restricted the
analysis to the case in which the government would choose the pay in the
military such that civilians and soldiers invest equally in education. In some
cases the government may choose a compensation package in which this is
not the case. However, choosing such compensation package would only be
optimal if it further improved welfare with a professional army, as compared
with an army of draftees.
With respect to transition dynamics and political allure, the scenarios
presented in this section do not lend to further insights, compared to those
in Section 4: Even though the draft system is inferior to the professional
army, the older generations will still advocate its introduction and object to
its abolition.
We derived all our results assuming individuals to be ex ante identical.
Accounting for individual heterogeneity would further strengthen the case for
professional army as this would allow to exploit di¤erences in comparative
advantage.
17
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze e¢ciency and distributional implications of the
military draft and other compulsory work services. A speci…c and, to our
knowledge, novel aspect of our paper is its focus on the introduction and
abolition of such schemes. We adopt a dynamic framework, taking into ac-
count that both the draft and levying wage taxes a¤ect individual incentives
to invest in education. The draft forces young people to work for the govern-
ment, thus postponing their education and entry to the labor market, and
shortening their remaining working career. Wage taxes reduce the after-tax
return to education, thus also discouraging investment in education.
We show that even if the draft were not plagued by ine¢cient matches be-
tween people and jobs, the lack of specialization, or other static ine¢ciencies
it would still be a worse solution for steady-state generations than levying
wage taxes to acquire the same labor input in market wages. The initially
older generation, however, gains from the introduction of the draft since it
will save the taxes it would, with a professional army, have had to pay. All
future generations would lose. Abolishing the draft allows to reduce welfare
losses and can always be implemented in a Pareto-improving manner. How-
ever, the utility available to steady-state generations after a draft system has
been abolished in a Pareto-improving manner still falls short of their utility
if a draft system had not been introduced in the …rst place. The reason for
this is that a Pareto-improving elimination of draft requires collecting taxes
only from the young, so as not to levy a double burden on the elderly who
have already been subject to the draft. Importantly, our results generalize
to the case of di¤erent types of education and also hold when military draft
takes place only after education has been completed. The key to the latter
observation is the timing e¤ect. The net present value of the burden that
draft imposes exceeds the net present value of wage taxes needed to purchase
the same services at market wages.
The draft can be understood and (mis-)used as a device for intergen-
erational redistribution, as it one-sidedly levies parts of the costs for the
provision of government services on the young generations. In ageing Euro-
pean societies that, due to pay-as-you-go …nancing of pensions and health
care, already load the lion’s share of the burden of demographic transitions
on younger generations, draft systems acerbate the intergenerational imbal-
ances. It may well be questioned whether – apart from being unnecessarily
costly – compulsory military or social services pass any meaningful test for
intergenerational fairness.
The speci…c intergenerational incidence may help to explain the political
allure of military draft and its corollaries. In our model with two overlapping
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generations, the older cohort bene…ts from introducing the draft. Moreover,
once a draft scheme is installed, its abolition would harm the older genera-
tion, at least if one reasonably assumes that levying age-speci…c taxes is not
feasible. The gist of these observations easily extends to models with larger
numbers of overlapping generations (which may possibly be of unequal sizes).
Since age cohorts beyond the draft age typically outnumber younger cohorts
at or below the draft age, both the introduction and the continuance of mili-
tary draft garner widespread political support – in spite of their ine¢ciency.
Our approach focused on the economic aspects of military draft, in par-
ticular on its dynamic costs. Advocates of military draft tend to refer to
its political virtues: embedding democratic controls in the army, reducing
the likelihood of war etc. Empirical evidence on these aspects seems to
be mixed, to say the least. Analyzing militarized interstate disputes from
1886 to 1992, Choi and James (2003) …nd that a military manpower sys-
tem with conscripted soldiers is associated with more military disputes than
professional or voluntary armies. Based on cross-sectional data from 1980,
Anderson et al. (1996) conclude also that “warlike” states are more likely to
employ conscription.
In recent years, quite a number of countries have abolished military draft
(while, e.g., similar reforms in pay-as-you-go pension schemes are still un-
heard of). This seems to contradict our proposition that conscription is,
ceteris paribus, unlikely to disappear once installed. However, it should
be noticed that the abolition of military draft in many countries paralleled
other changes in the social, military, and geopolitical environment. Standing
armies for territorial defense have become increasingly obsolete, technological
changes have rendered warfare less labor-intensive, and many countries have
reduced their military expenditures since the end of the Cold War. All this
made the transition from draft to professional army less costly for those op-
posing it. In our model, these e¤ects could be captured by an increase in the
specialization parameter ¯ or by a reduction in ¹m, the numéraire-equivalent
of military output.10 Moreover, we derived our result in the absence of other
intergenerational transfer institutions, most notably pay-as-you-go pensions.
These give the older generation a stake in the future productivity of the cur-
rent young. Therefore, an increase in pensions and health-care costs may
well have motivated political support to abolish military draft, as the elderly
also share part of the burden through reductions in the tax base for other
transfers. A detailed analysis and empirical testing of the link between draft
10Indeed, the share of military expenditure in GDP for France, Belgium, Italy, The
Netherlands, and Spain (all countries that abolished conscription) decreased from 3.5, 2.4,
2.1„ 2.5, 1.8 percent in 1989 to, respectively, 2.6, 1.3, 1.9, 1.6, and 1.2 percent in 2002.
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and other intergenerational transfer institutions, however, is left for future
research.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Denote the function on the RHS of (9) by Á(e); it is strictly decreasing in e
and Á(ed) = 0. Evaluate Á for e = ep and replace ¡c0(ep) from (8):
Á(ep) = ¡c0(ep) + w0(ep) ¢ (¡¡ ¹m)
= w0(ep) ¢
·
¡¡ ¹m ¡ ¡ ¢ (2¡ ®)w(e
p)¡ ¹m
(2¡ ®)w(ep)
¸
:
The square-bracketed expression is negative if and only if
w(ep) >
¡
2¡ ®:
This condition always holds due to (2) and w(e) being increasing in e and
therefore w(ep) > w(0) = 1. We, thus, have Á(ep) < 0 = Á(ed) and the claim
ed < ep follows from the strict monotonicity of Á.
As productivity increases in e and the government always takes away
the same absolute amount ¹m of resources for the military, the assertions for
output and consumption follow immediately.
To establish the utility comparison, denote by ¿ p the equilibrium tax rate
in an economy with a professional army. Then the following inequalities hold:
V p = ¡c(ep) + (1¡ ¿ p)w(ep)¡
¸ ¡c(ed) + (1¡ ¿p)w(ed)¡
= ¡c(ed) + w(ed)¡¡ ¹m
(2¡ ®)w(ep)w(e
d)¡
> ¡c(ed) + w(ed)(¡¡ ¹m) = V d:
The second line is by a revealed-preference argument, the third replaces the
budget-balancing tax rate ¿ p, and the fourth follows from (10). ²
Proof of Proposition 2
Denote the function on the RHS of (14) by Ã(e). Observe that Ã(ea) = 0
and that Ã is strictly decreasing around ea: Ã0(ea) < 0.11 Evaluate Ã for
11As ea is a utility-maximizing choice, this follows from the second-order condition.
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e = ep and replace ¡c0(ep) from (8):
Ã(ep) = ¡c0(ep) + w0(ep) ¢
·
1¡ ®+ 1
1 + r
¡ ¹m
w(ep)
¸
= w0(ep) ¢ ¹m
w(ep)
¢
µ
¡
2¡ ® ¡ 1
¶
· 0 = Ã(ea)
where the non-positive sign of Ã(ep) follows from (2). The sign will be
strictly negative whenever r > 0. We therefore have ep ¸ ea due to the
local monotonicity of Ã; the inequality being strict in the presence of dis-
counting.
As productivity increases in e and the government always takes away
the same absolute amount ¹m of resources for the military, the assertions for
output and consumption follow immediately. For utilities we get the following
(in-)equalities:
V p = ¡c(ep) + (1¡ ¿ p)w(ep)¡
¸ ¡c(ea) + (1¡ ¿ p)w(ea)¡
= ¡c(ea) + w(ea)
µ
1¡ ®+ 1
1 + r
¡ ¡
2¡ ® ¢
¹m
w(ep)
¶
¸ ¡c(ea) + w(ea)
µ
1¡ ®+ 1
1 + r
¡ ¹m
w(ep)
¶
¸ ¡c(ea) + w(ea)
µ
1¡ ®+ 1
1 + r
¡ ¹m
w(ea)
¶
= V a:
The second line follows by a revealed-preference argument, the third replaces
the budget-balancing tax rate ¿ p and expands terms, the fourth follows from
(2), and the …fth from ea · ep. The inequalities in the fourth and …fth lines
will be strict whenever r > 0. ²
Proof of Proposition 3
Calculate:
V a ¡ V d = ¡c(ea) + c(ed) + w(ea)
µ
¡¡ ¹m
w(ea)
¶
¡ w(ed) (¡¡ ¹m)
=
·
¡c(ea) + w(ea)
µ
¡¡ ¹m
w(ea)
¶
+ c(ed)¡ w(ed)
µ
¡¡ ¹m
w(ed)
¶¸
+
¡
w(ed)¡ 1¢ ¢ ¹m:
The expression in square brackets in the second line is non-negative as ea
maximizes ¡c(e) + w(e)
³
¡¡ ¹m
w(e)
´
. The bracketed expression in the third
line is positive since w(ed) > 1. Hence, V a > V d.
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To show that human capital investment will be lower in an economy with
a draft than in one with an abolished draft, we evaluate the function Á(e)
from the proof of Proposition 1 at ea:
Á(ea) = ¡c0(ea) + w0(ea) ¢ (¡¡ ¹m)
= w0(ea) ¢
·
¡¡ + ¹m
w(ea)
+ ¡¡ ¹m
¸
= ¡w0(ea) ¢ ¹m ¢
µ
1¡ 1
w(ea)
¶
< 0 = Á(ed):
Hence, ea > ed due to the strict monotonicity of Á(e). ²
Proof of Proposition 4
With compensation scheme (19), the FOC for ec (and thus also ecm) reads:
¡c0(ec) + (1¡ ¿ )w0(ec)
·
1¡ ® + 1
1 + r
¸
= 0:
Let g 2 (0; 1) be the fraction of individuals choosing to be a soldier. National
income at a point in time comprises the output produced by the young plus
output produced by the old. In a steady state where, in all periods, everybody
chooses identical education e¤ort:
y(ec) = [g(1¡ ®)(1¡ ¯)° + (1¡ g)(1¡ ®) + g + (1¡ g)]w(e)
= (2¡ ®)w(e)
where ° was replaced by (1¡ ¯)¡1. The exogenous military output ¹m must
be produced and …nanced. Production in the army requires ¹m = gw(ec)(1¡
®)(1¡ ¯), leading to an army of size
g =
¹m
w(ec)(1¡ ®)(1¡ ¯) :
Financing the army by a linear income tax requires ° ¹m = ¿y or:
1
1¡ ¯ ¹m = ¿ (2¡ ®)w(e
c):
Hence, solving for ¿ , we obtain:
¿ =
¹m
(2¡ ®)(1¡ ¯)w(ec) =: ¿
c:
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Plugging ¿ into the FOC gives:
¡c0(ec) + (1¡ ¿ c)
·
1¡ ®+ 1
1 + r
¸
w0(ec) = 0;
or, after, replacing ¿ c and re-arranging terms,
c0(ec) =
·
1¡ ® + 1
1 + r
¡ ¹m
(1¡ ¯)w(ec) +
¹m
(2¡ ®)(1¡ ¯)w(ec)
r
1 + r
¸
w0(ec)
which implicitly de…nes the equilibrium value of ec.
Draftees deliver military service of length d after acquiring their full civil-
ian education. Their lifetime utility equals
U c(e) = ¡c(e) +
·
1¡ ® ¡ d + 1
1 + r
¸
w(e);
and their optimal investment in civilian education is derived from
¡c0(ed) +
·
1¡ ® ¡ d + 1
1 + r
¸
w0(ed) = 0:
Here, the length of the draft spell necessary to produce military output
¹m is determined by
¹m = d(1¡ ¯)w(ed):
De…ne
Ã(e) := ¡c0(e) +
·
1¡ ® + 1
1 + r
¡ ¹m
(1¡ ¯)w(e)
¸
w0(e): (22)
The equilibrium value of ed is then implicitly de…ned by Ã(ec) = 0. Ob-
serve that
Ã0(e) := ¡c00(e) +
·
1¡ ®+ 1
1 + r
¡ ¹m
(1¡ ¯)w(e)
¸
w00(e) +
¹mw0(e)2
(1¡ ¯)w(e)2
This is negative at least for small values of ¹m=w(e). This holds for demo-
cratic countries in peacetime, where military output is small, relative to total
output. We henceforth assume that Ã0(e) < 0. Then,
ec ¸ ed () Ã(ec) · 0:
Now evaluate Ã at ec:
Ã(ec) = ¡c0(ec) +
·
1¡ ®+ 1
1 + r
¡ ¹m
(1¡ ¯)w(ec)
¸
w0(ec)
= ¡ ¹m
(2¡ ®)(1¡ ¯)w(ec)
r
1 + r
w0(ec);
which is negative as long as r > 0. Hence, ec > ed. The assertions for output
and consumption follow immediately. ²
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Proof of Proposition 5
With g 2 (0; 1) as the fraction of individuals choosing to be a soldier, steady-
state national income when everybody chooses the same education e¤ort
amounts to:
y(ec) = [g(1¡ ®)° + (1¡ g)(1¡ ®) + g(1¡ ¯) + (1¡ g)]w(e)
=
·
2¡ ® ¡ gr¯
1 + r
¸
w(e)
where ° was replaced by (20) in the second line. Production of the exogenous
military output ¹m requires an army of size
g =
¹m
w(e)(1¡ ®) :
Using this and the de…nition of y, the tax rate necessary to …nance the army
by a linear income tax (° ¹m = ¿y) turns out to be
¿ c :=
h
1 + ¯
(1¡®)(1+r)
i
¹mh
2¡ ® ¡ ¹mr¯
w(ec)(1¡®)(1+r)
i
w(e)
:
The FOC for ec (and thus also ecm) reads:
¡c0(e) + (1¡ ¿ )w0(e)
·
1¡ ®+ 1
1 + r
¸
= 0:
Inserting ¿ c implicitly de…nes the equilibrium value of ec:
¡c0(ec) + (1¡ ¿ c)
·
1¡ ®+ 1
1 + r
¸
w0(ec) = 0:
For a draft system, we can refer to the proof of Proposition 4. Evaluating Ã,
as de…ned in (22), at ec yields:
Ã(ec) = ¡c0(ec) +
·
1¡ ®+ 1
1 + r
¡ ¹m
(1¡ ¯)w(ec)
¸
w0(ec)
=
½
¿ c
·
1¡ ® + 1
1 + r
¸
¡ ¹m
(1¡ ¯)w(ec)
¾
w0(ec)
=
(
1 + ¯
(1¡®)(1+r)
2¡ ® ¡ ¹mr¯
w(ec)(1¡®)(1+r)
¢
·
1¡ ®+ 1
1 + r
¸
¡ 1
1¡ ¯
)
w0(ec) ¹m
w(ec)
where the second line used the implicit de…nition of ec. The condition Ã(ec) ·
0 is equivalent to (21). ²
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The case ® = 0 (Section 5)
For ® = 0, condition (21) is equivalent to
¹mr¯
w(ec)(1¡ ¯) + (2 + r)
·
1 +
¯
1 + r
¸
· 2(1 + r)
1¡ ¯
In order to be able to produce military output by those with civilian
education and living in their …rst period, it has to be that ¹m < (1¡¯)w(ec).
The inequality above is thus strictly satis…ed at least if
(1+r)(r¯(1¡¯)¡2(1+r))+(2+r)(1¡¯)(1+r+¯) = ¡r(1+¯+r)¡¯2(2+2r+r2)
is non-positive. This holds for all ¯; r ¸ 0. ²
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